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the defense when induced by a law enforcement officer. The query
remains, why should one not be punished if he commits a crime?
The problems raised go far deeper than the time and space
allotted to this comment. However, in the final analysis, the basic
problem appears to be one of law enforcement rather than one of
judicial interpretation. The courts may never be able to formulate
an adequate criterion for determining when or how the defense
should be applied. Instead, the answer to the injustice and the inequality that often result should be found in newer and better methods
of detection of those crimes which are now plagued by the defense.
Robert William Burk, Jr.

Criminal Procedure--Trial of Co-defendants-Right of
Silence Violated
D was convicted of receiving and facilitating transportation and
concealment of narcotic drugs, and purchasing and acquiring narcotic drugs in violation of the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act.
Before trial D's co-defendant moved for a severance. Motion was
denied. Although D did not take the stand, the co-defendant did
testify, and imputed all the blame to D. Co-defendant's counsel made
repeated comments on D's failure to testify and engaged in extended
colloquy with the court and D's counsel over these comments. The
court overruled D's motion for mistrial and instructed the jury of
D's right to decline to testify and that such failure to testify should
not be considered in arriving at a verdict. Held, reversed. D had
a constitutionally guaranteed right to silence free from prejudicial
comments, even when they came only from co-defendant's attorney.
Considering the collision between the two defendants, the imputation of guilt to D arising from the references to silence could not be
cured by instructions to the jury to disregard the comments. De Luna
v. United States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
Most of the issues raised by this case are not new or unusual
as applied to federal court practice. Rule 14 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure states that a court may order separate trials
if it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a
joinder of offenses. FED. R. Cl-M. P. 14. It is clear that severance
rests within the sound discretion of the court, and a refusal of sev-
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erance is not assignable as error unless abuse of discretion is affirmatively shown. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583 (1919). Thus,
the trial court in the principal case clearly had the power to refuse
to grant separate trials.
It is also firmly established that one has the right to refuse to
testify in a proceeding in which he is a defendant. U. S. CONST.
amend. V. Although at common law a defendant was not competent
as a witness at his own trial, this rule was long ago abandoned and
the contrary is now universally true. However, in spite of the fact
that one may be a competent witness in his own defense, his failure
to testify cannot create any presumption against him. Bradford v.
United States, 130 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1942); 18 U.S.C. § 3481
(1958). To reinforce the requirement that no presumption of guilt
shall arise from a defendant's failure to testify, the federal courts
have held that no comment or argument about defendant's failure to
take the stand is permissible. Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1
(1961); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893). Although
it has been held that comment on a defendant's failure to testify
is ground for mistrial, Stewart v. United States, supra, the inference
raised by the comment may be cured by the court's instructions.
Langford v. United States, 178 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1949). Thus,
whether the prejudice may be overcome by the court's instructions
seems to depend on the nature and extent of the comments and the
circumstances of the case. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals was
therefore clearly within its rights in declaring that, in the principal
case, the prejudice resulting to D was so great that it could not be
cured by the court's directions to the jury that they were not to
consider D's failure to take the stand.
The most disturbing and perplexing elements of the opinion
in the principal case is the inference that counsel for the co-defendant
has the right to comment on D's failure to testify. It is not patently
clear from the opinion of the majority of the court that co-defendant's
counsel has the right. See De Luna v. United States, supra at 143
and 154. However, the implication that such a right exists is so
strong that one member of the court make this the subject of a special concurring opinion. The concurring judge points out that a
rule allowing co-defendant's counsel the right to so comment must
necessarily result in one of three alternatives: (1) elimination of
joint trials where there is a representation to the court that one
co-defendant does not expect to testify; (2) a right to a mistrial
during final arguments; or (3) built-in reversible error, all in the
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discretion of the defendants. De Luna v. United States, supra at
156. Although the cases are clear on the point that a prosecutor
may not comment on a defendant's failure to take the stand, no case
is found squarely holding that a co-defendant's counsel may not
make such comment. On principle, it would appear that there is
no difference in the two situations as far as the protection of the
non-testifying defendant is concerned. Indeed, the prejudice may
be greater in the case of comment by counsel for a co-defendant,
since the prosecutor as the representative of the state might be expected to recognize the responsibility for fair comment while counsel
for the defendant, in his zeal for his client's cause, might not be
expected to exercise as much discretion. Therefore, the concern for
one defendant's right to silence free from prejudice must be balanced against the high dignity of the duty which counsel owes to
his client to avail himself of every allowable opportunity to protect
that client.
In West Virginia persons jointly indicted for a felony have an
absolute right to be tried separately. W. VA. CODE ch. 63, art. 3,
§ 8 (Michie 1961). The existence of a joint defendant's right to separate trial was recently recognized by the West Virginia Supreme
Court for the first time in a case in which that question was actually
in issue. State ex rel. Zirk v. Muntzing, 120 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va.
1961). See 64 W. VA. L. REv. 110 (1961).
The courts of the various states have generally followed the
federal rule in refusing to allow comment on a defendant's failure
to testify in his own behalf. The only states which appear to allow
such comment are California, Ohio, Counecticut, Iowa, New Jersey,
and New Mexico. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272 (McNaughton
rev. 1961). In West Virginia, it is specifically provided by statute
that a defendant's failure to testify shall create no presumption against
him and shall not be the subject of comment before the court or
jury by anyone. W. VA. CODE ch. 57, art. 3, § 6 (Michie 1961).
This provision of the Code has been interpreted by the court to entitle a defendant to a new trial if the state's attorney comments on
his failure to testify. See State v. Self, 130 W. Va. 515, 44 S.E.2d
582 (1947); State v. Jones, 108 W. Va. 264, 150 S.E. 728 (1929);
State v. Costa, 101 W. Va. 466, 132 S.E. 869 (1926). The court has
held, however, that the error may be cured by excluding the comment and directing the jury to disregard it. Thus, the West Virginia
statute does not provide that every violation shall require setting
aside the verdict, and the trial court may therefore decide whether,
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in its judgment, such harm has been done to the accused as to require a new trial. State v. Chisnell, 36 W. Va. 659, 15 S.E. 412
(1892).
In West Virginia, as in the federal courts, the specific question
of whether or not a co-defendant's attorney may comment on defendant's failure to testify has not been decided. However, the court
has strongly implied that it will construe the provisions of the statute
very strictly, and will permit no comment whatsoever on a defendant's
failure to testify. In State v. Taylor, 57 W. Va. 228, 234, 50 S.E. 247,
249 (1905) which involved comment on an accused's failure to call
his wife to corroborate his testimony, the court said that the statutory terms are very broad and that ".

.

. all persons are forbidden

to make any reference to his failure [to testify]."
Thus, the dilemma presented by De Luna v. United States, supra,
seems not to arise in West Virginia. The co-defendant's absolute
right to be separately tried, coupled with the statutory prohibition
against any comment concerning an accused's failure to take the
stand, furnishes as perfect a solution to the problem as could reasonably be expected. Perhaps the problem could be best resolved
in the federal courts by providing for separate trial of jointly indicted
defendants where it is shown that one expects to take the stand to
testify and the other expects to remain silent.
Robert Edward Haden

Evidence-Federal Shop-Book Rule-Admissibility of
Hospital Records
P brought an action for injuries sustained when struck by D's
automobile. The trial court refused to admit in evidence the results
of a test for intoxication conducted on P at the Navy hospital where
he was treated. The district court rendered a judgment for P and D
appealed. Held, reversed and remaided for a new trial. The court
of appeals held that prejudicial error was committed in excluding
from evidence the hospital records showing results of the intoxication test, such being properly admissible in evidence under the
federal shop-book rule. Thomas v. Hogan, 308 F.2d 355 (4th Cir.
1962).
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